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I. The Many Faces of Non-Identity
Žižek relies on three articulations of impossibility to generate the dynamic that animates his 
dialectical materialism: repetition, reduction, and remainder.1 (Žižek 2001: 78-83) Across his 
catalogue of works Žižek develops the critique of ideology through the methodological structure 
of this ‘dialectical materialist’ approach. As a methodology dialectical materialism is composed of 
four moments that constitute the procedure as a method: firstly the positing of some thesis, 
secondly the reversal of the thesis, thirdly the inversion of the reversed thesis, and finally the 
inverse reversal of the thesis which constitutes a new positing.2 (Buck-Morss 1979: 77-81) An 
example of this is as follows: ‘“all history is natural” and therefore transitory,’ ‘“all nature is 
historical” and therefore socially produced,’ ‘“actual history is not historical” but merely the 
representation of the victor,’ and finally ‘representation is unnatural because it denies the 
transitoriness of history.’ (Buck-Morss 1979: 131) Žižek follows the method of dialectical 
materialism to intervene in and critique ideology through moments of ‘non-identity,’ the limit of 
political, social, and cultural identification and belief. 
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This materialist and dialectical unfolding of ideology-critique with Žižek’s characteristic 
blending of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and popular culture is particular to Žižek’s ‘Slovenian’ 
brand of ideology-critique. While such ideology-critique is bound to French political philosophy 
and social critique after Althusser, it is important to note that the kind of ideology-critique Žižek is 
engaged in is also highly reminiscent of the early Frankfurt School scholarship. This germane 
relation is flagged by the two particular ways that Žižek uses non-identity: the critique of 
aesthetics and the demystified structure of existence a propos ideology-critique. The first of 
these is characterised by attentiveness to the socioeconomic conditions of the aesthetic field. 
Žižek is not in search of a theory of art to justify his dialectical materialism, but rather he treats 
the aesthetic dimension of any object as the grounds for ideology-critique to take place. (Žižek 
2006b: 3-13) Such a move is highly reminiscent of the way Adorno produced his various 
critiques during his association with the early Frankfurt School. 
Like Žižek, Adorno maintained an intellectual procedure where the critical philosophical 
gaze intervenes in the object to reveal its non-identity with itself. (Buck-Morss 1979: 47) An 
example of this comes from Adorno’s early critique of Kierkegaard, which holds to the formal 
structure of his later analyses with the Frankfurt School. (Buck-Morss 1979: 23) In this critique 
Adorno turns the socioeconomic forces sustaining and producing the bourgeois intérieur against 
Kierkegaard’s mystical departure into existentialism, charging that Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
dissolves the worldliness it sets out to salvage from Hegel. (Buck-Morss 1979: 115) This 
inversion of Kierkegaard allows Adorno to bring the Danish existentialist’s philosophical project 
into the dialectical fold of materialism and further Adorno’s end of renewing the validity and value 
of aesthetics as a domain for unearthing and “knowing objective truth.” (Buck-Morss 1979: 114) 
This valuation of aesthetics goes well beyond the importance (or lack of) either Kierkegaard or 
Hegel imagined for the aesthetic field. The privileging of aesthetics by Adorno gives his ideology-
critique a particular slant where we find aesthetics deployed to read the formal conditions of 
various political scenarios. 
This aesthetic over-determination is similarly characteristic of Žižek’s ideology-critique. 
An example of this is Žižek’s careful reading of Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ode To Joy, the 
unofficial anthem of the European Union (E.U.), to articulate the economic movements and 
social inconsistencies within the political constitution of the E.U. (Žižek 2006: 569-572) In this 
reading Žižek clearly shows his critique’s indebtedness to Adorno: 
Of course, these lines are not meant as a criticism of Beethoven; quite the contrary, in an 
Adornian mode, one should discern in this failure of the fourth movement Beethoven’s 
artistic integrity: the truthful indexing of the failure of the very Enlightenment project of 
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universal brotherhood. (Žižek 2006: 571)
Here Žižek is distilling the moment of non-identity not as the positing of some transcendental 
truth but as the ‘truthful indexing’ of a failure in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony that is integral to 
the constitution of the work as a whole. In Adorno’s critique of Kierkegaard the valorisation of 
interpretation leads him into the spaces of the bourgeois intérieur in order to fragment 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical project so it could be remade to serve the intervening interrogative 
method of dialectical materialism. A point of similarity therefore emerges with the respective 
critiques of Adorno and Žižek insofar as Kierkegaard’s mysticism is the product of a doubled-
interiority of the subject that Adorno intervenes in by critiquing the spiritual ‘double’ as the 
bourgeois intérieur. (Adorno 1989: 40-46) Thus Kierkegaard’s ‘religious’ dimension is deprived of 
its belief and collapses back into the material aesthetic field where the process of ideology-
critique can then set about locating its constitutive non-identity (i.e. the spiritual double) and 
demystifying the bourgeois intérieur as a socially formed historical object.
While Žižek is interested in the spaces beyond the reign of interpretation, Adorno’s 
affirmative analysis of interpretation in his critique of Kierkegaard gives Žižek’s ideology-critique 
an aesthetic basis from which to depart. This fundamentally colours Žižek’s dialectics and 
materialism, and proffers the opportunity for him to laterally engage with ideology across the 
spectrum of everyday life. Yet, like Adorno, Žižek pushes the aesthetic field to its very limits of its 
demystification in this engagement.
II. Simulation and Geisteskritik
The demystification aimed for by the dialectical materialism discussed above is clearly not a 
direct correspondence between what a subject knows and an objective order of reality against 
which this knowledge can be simply indexed. In Žižek’s ideology-critique however, this 
demystification does invoke a loose correspondence between the constitutive failure that limits 
knowledge and the life-world (Lebenswelt) of the subject. This correspondence marks each 
terrain with a particular topology. Žižek expresses the genesis of this topology through the aim of 
demystification: it does not target some extra-worldly transparency but the opaque core of our 
everyday experience that resists interpretation.
We should be careful here to resist reading this relationship between opacity and 
transparency as a simple binary-opposition because, as a topology, the relation is far more 
ambiguous and complex than a simple juxtaposition of ideas. In The Plague of Fantasies Žižek 
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gives a good example of the problematic ideological comportment of transparency in the 
instance of technology: 
Modernist technology is ‘transparent’ in the sense of retaining the illusion of an insight 
into ‘how the machine works’; that is to say, the screen of the interface was supposed to 
allow the user direct access to the machine behind the screen… The postmodernist 
‘transparency’ designates almost the exact opposite… the interface screen is supposed 
to conceal the workings of the machine, and to simulate our everyday experience as 
faithfully as possible. (Žižek 1997: 131)
Here Žižek aligns transparency with the power of belief, the faith in instrumental thinking that 
guides human practices and communication in everyday life. The path of this belief in 
instrumentalising everyday life may appear to lead into a culture of calculation that the dialectics 
of Žižek’s materialism accounts for. Yet rather the problem for Žižek is how this instrumental 
mode of thought hides its culture of calculation with the post-modern “culture of simulation.” 
(Žižek 1997: 131) The term ‘simulation’ aptly captures the nuances Žižek gives to the 
incommensurability between the conception of an object the subject retains and the resistance 
of the object to the subject’s subjectivisation of it. We may even go so far as to extend this 
notion to include the body of the subject, inasmuch as the subject has some relation to their 
embodied appearance. This resistance (non-identity) of the object provokes Žižek to find an 
interlocutor with the meaninglessness of existence portrayed in Kierkegaard’s existentialism in a 
similar way to Adorno. However, where Adorno liquidates Kierkegaard’s idealism Žižek draws 
out an opacity that underlies the Ideal, the apex of idealism. (Buck-Morss 1979: 111-121; Žižek 
2006b: 206) This opacity comes to bear on the subject through the verisimilitude of the culture of 
simulation.
Simulation presents a problem for Adorno’s elevation of interpretation in his Geisteskritik 
(critique of spirit/ideas). If we examine the case of his critique of Kierkegaard for example, 
Adorno states: 
All Kierkegaard’s gloomy motives have good critical sense as soon as they are 
interpreted in terms of social critique. Many of his positive assertions gain the concrete 
significance they otherwise lack as soon as one translates them into concepts of a right 
society. (Buck-Morss 1979: 121)
While Žižek is similarly engaged in social critique, his framing of post-modern simulation 
collapses the category of ‘right society’ that Adorno appeals to. (Žižek 1997: 140-143) Perhaps it 
is this that motivates Žižek to not propose an alternative social or political model, and instead 
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provide a vigorous critical interpretation of existing ideological conditions. (Žižek 2002a: 132-
134) In light of this intervening tone of Žižek’s ideology-critique it is necessary to consider that if 
the realm of everyday experience is simulated by the technology, which in no small way goes 
toward constituting the fabric of this everyday experience, then the rightness of everyday life is 
not being called to justify itself. The question of a reference to some measure outside the self-
legitimation/self-referentiality of everyday experience is made irrelevant by technological 
simulation. Given that technology is part of human activity, party to the Aristotelian relation of 
techne to praxis and poiesis, interpretation is here restricted as that point where techne folds 
back into itself. Žižek refuses to outline an alternative political model because it is the everyday 
life that is the focus of his critiques. (Butler et al 2000: 9) Even when Žižek takes aim at 
international politics, he is all the time referring his readers to the everyday reality of these 
politics, the inescapability of their formal structure. (Žižek 1993: 200-237)
The shift from imitation to simulation in the conception of technological transparency is 
important for everyday reality because it marks an adjustment in the correspondence between 
our conception of the world and the activities through which we engage with the world. As the 
interface of technology comes to more and more simulate our everyday experience, 
The price of this illusion of a continuity with our everyday environs is that the user 
becomes ‘accustomed to opaque technology’… In other words, the user renounces the 
endeavour to grasp the functioning of the computer, resigning himself to the fact that in 
his interaction with cyberspace he is thrown into a non-transparent situation analogous to 
that of his everyday Lebenswelt. (Žižek 1997: 131)
Within everyday experience we have to ‘find our bearings’ by trial and error, and Žižek is 
therefore suggesting that trial and error is faithfully simulated for us by our relation to technology. 
In effect, this technological simulation of Sisyphean everydayness reinforces that the 
conceptions of the subject must conform to the structure of the object for human praxis to take 
place; “the postmodernist universe is the universe of naïve trust in the screen which makes the 
very quest of ‘what lies behind it’ irrelevant.” (Žižek 1997: 132) This naïve acceptance is 
problematic for Žižek because it exposes the subject to a kind of phenomenological stupor as 
regards finding their way in their life-world where the totality of phenomenal appearance is 
trusted as a self-sufficient whole. This trust is underscored by Žižek as a trust in the opaque 
object, a trust which forfeits the subjectivisation of the subject. The domination by the 
phenomenological comportment of the object therefore dominates the conception of the object, 
and exposes the narcissistic belief of the subject to the extreme vulnerability of “actual psychic 
contact with another person.” (Žižek 1997: 133) 
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In the post-modernist universe this opaque interiority of consciousness which defines the 
subject from the object is problematic in its relation to the world because it is constantly on the 
brink of disruption. (Žižek 1999: 103-104) This precariousness comes of looking toward the 
opaque object for some point of identification without being critical of the effects of this object. 
Here alienation can take place within the confines of the life-world, with the important Lacanian 
qualification that alienation takes place along the imaginary axis of binary oppositions, i.e. 
subject-object, right-wrong, passive-active, etc. That is to say, the naïve trust in the 
phenomenology of everyday experience alienates the subject’s techne from identification by 
turning it inward, e.g. the subject ‘does’ being in the container of her/his life-world. This 
alienation embeds techne in an imaginary scenario where understanding the function of techne 
(its knowable objective truth) is made irrelevant. (Žižek 1999: 107-110) The prosthesis and 
extension of the human in its technological metamorphoses is therefore a moment of bondage to 
the prevailing binary oppositions in our everyday experience/life-world rather than emancipatory 
and of symbolic overwriting/separation. The subject is thus doomed to compulsive repetition, to 
endlessly repeat the attempt to identify with the object where the very opacity of the object 
means that it resists inclusion in the identity of the subject that seeks to identify with it. Yet, all 
too tragically, the subject needs these objects of the life-world to identify their position in the 
symbolic universe otherwise they are bereft of their particular subjective constitution. The culture 
of simulation is thus a form of compensation for this lack of social separation, attempting to 
mimic the delineation of the individual in her/his autonomy when it is merely a repetition of the 
‘instrumentation’ of everyday experience.
III. Returning to Repetition in Kierkegaard
Žižek formulates the repetition derived from the culture of simulation in three different 
dispositions co-extensive with Kierkegaard’s philosophy and Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory: the 
aesthetic attempt to recreate, the repetitive appeal to some symbolic mandate in ethics, and the 
religious compulsion to repeat historical events outside the frame of historical necessity. (Žižek 
2001: 78-83) However, as above it is important to note that repetition relies on a fundamental 
opacity (impossibility) of the object that antagonises the subject to repeat. (Žižek 2001: 78-79) 
When encountered in an imaginary scenario this impossibility of repetition is experienced “under 
the guise of the imaginary deadlocks that the subject encounters when he endeavors to 
resuscitate the fullness of past pleasures.” (Žižek 2001: 78) This is the attitude of the aesthete, 
the subject who professes a great sensitivity to the beauty of art and nature. (Žižek 2002: 113) 
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This is also the subject of the culture of simulation whose techne is consistently configured to 
appear with the same immediacy as everyday experience. The sensitivity of the aesthete is 
therefore problematic because of their sensitivity to the ineffability of beauty. And this ineffability 
has its repercussions for the subject in the way “even if, on the level of ‘reality,’ the thing is 
exactly the same, it now leaves him cold and indifferent.” (Žižek 2001: 78) Coupled with binary 
opposition, repetition therefore traps the subject in their processes of failed identification 
because repetition becomes the apogee of identity, never making identity successful but at the 
same time being the process through which it can be achieved. In Žižek’s Lacanian terminology 
this repetition is the drive of the ego-ideal toward the Ideal-ego, the concept the subject has of 
their phenomenological self in some relation to what they want to believe they are. (Žižek 1989: 
121-123)
If we reflect on this impotence of identification, to ask whether our wish to identify with 
the opaque object in the first place is justified, this reflection must invoke an ethical or symbolic 
domain which can supply the measure of this process. Indeed, such a measure is already 
inherent to the acknowledgement of the failure of identification. (Freud 1962: 253-254) In this 
ethical register the subject is within a ‘symbolic universe’ where repetition “is a sign of maturity… 
We find satisfaction in the return of the Same.” (Žižek 2001: 78) This satisfaction is structured 
around the enjoyment of the repetition of a signifier. In terms of a shift away from the aesthetic 
subject held in the embrace of the culture of simulation, the ethical stage is characterised by a 
shift toward the techne of identification. This techne is repetition, but in the symbolic register 
repetition is a difficult failing; it constitutes the ideal point “at which we overcome the futile 
yearning for the New without falling into a nostalgic backward-directed attitude, [which] is never 
present as such.” (Žižek 2001: 78) Žižek here signals the self-referential paradox of the symbolic 
universe: the ideal point between hope (the belief in the Ideal-ego) and memory (the trust in the 
ego-ideal) is present “only in the mode of hope or memory.” (Žižek 2001: 79) Thus in place of 
the wild procession of imaginary deadlocks/binary oppositions, where the subject announces 
they are ‘this and not that,’ we find the Ideal future perfect already present in the ego-ideal 
(Mallarmé’s ‘futur antérieur’). Herein the ego-ideal furnishes the retroactive reference of 
achieving identification with the Ideal-ego that refers us back to the reliable rhythm of our 
attempts to achieve the ideal point.
Further, this coalescing of the repetition to attain the ideal point and the enjoyment of this 
Ideal in its ideation constitutes techne. That is to say, techne is the mode of enjoying in and of 
the symbolic universe with the qualification that techne cannot be the Ideal, even though it 
promises the subject access to the Ideal-ego. Hence, in the structure of the culture of simulation 
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the role of techne is to reduce sociality to a circle of enjoyment, a tessellation of pleasure that 
functions as the guiding principle of post-modern sociality.
This formulation of techne sets the post-modern culture of simulation to appear with a 
shading of neutrality. Simply put, the reproduction of everyday experience is the universal norm 
of simulation. However, such simulation fails to repeat techne as a fundamental (artistic) gesture 
due to the ethical neutrality/separateness of its activity. (Žižek 2005a: 110) Here we are drawing 
out the line of Lacanian criticism so prevalent in Žižek ahead of his Leninist tendency to pass off 
freedom as a neutral loop because the culture of simulation entraps the subject in their life-world 
by compensating for the subject’s place in the symbolic universe by diffusing the unifying 
symbolic trait of the subject across many discursive forms. (Žižek 2004: 180-181) The culture of 
simulation is therefore subordinated to the symbolic universe where repetition is enacted as the 
repetition of a signifier that repeats “the symbolic trait unaire, the mark to which the object is 
reduced.” (Žižek 2001: 79) And this holds the important consequence that a culture of simulation 
has the symbolic effect of reducing the reality of everyday experience to a series of marks that 
overwrite the phenomenological/imaginary content of everyday experience, in turn which 
renders the everyday experience which the subject trusts as indistinct, kitsch, cosmetic, unreal, 
and so forth, although it nevertheless coordinates and promotes the subject’s compulsion to 
repeat rather than some limited freedom to choose. (Freud 2003: 83) A ‘free act’ thus becomes 
the intervention in and traversing of ‘culture’ as a type of diffusing compensation for this 
symbolic reduction of the subject to the trait unaire, to begin from the ordinance of ‘thou art that.’
Where the aesthete is beholden by the infinite march toward the Ideal-ego and the 
ethical subject reduces objects to a series of metonymic and metaphoric marks that stand-in for 
the objects, the third comportment of repetition in Kierkegaard invites a retroactive recognition of 
real necessity: 
What Kierkegaard has in mind here is, ultimately, the well-known opposition of two 
attitudes to history: when we are thrown into historical ‘becoming,’ caught in its flow, we 
experience the abyss of history’s ‘openness,’ we are forced to choose; afterward, when 
we cast a retrospective gaze on it, its course loses the character of ‘becoming’ and 
appears as the manifestation of some ‘eternal’ necessity. (Žižek 2001: 79)
The problem for Kierkegaard, according to Žižek’s commentary, is that those who comprehend 
the whole of history or cast prophecies on the future err on “the free decision involved in the act 
of becoming.” (Žižek 2001: 79) The repetition of history does not mean to re-enact what 
necessarily came to pass but to undermine the very status of history as a linear chain of 
necessity by making visible the “existential deadlock” of free decisions made at the time, “the 
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weight of decisions [people] were forced to assume within [a] unique constellation.” (Žižek 2001: 
79) Žižek is aiming here to elucidate the traumatism of the Real (necessity) where a failure to 
integrate the opacity of the object’s resistance to conceptual liquidation re-emerges in the 
repetition of the object in an imaginary scenario, symbolic universe, or a subject deprived of their 
subjectivity on the virtue of their free choice. (Žižek 2000: 148; 2002: 136-137) This formulation 
of repetition is important because it suggests that the point where concepts break down, their 
non-identity with the object they capture in their conceptualisation, can repeatedly emerge within 
the ahistorical stasis of the culture of simulation in post-modernity. (Žižek 2001: 80-81) This re-
emergence of the traumatic kernel of the object’s resistance to conceptualisation means that far 
from annihilating everyday experience by way of simulation, the technological saturation of post-
modernity is thwarted by the very reality it attempts to simulate. (Žižek 1999: 116)
IV. A Dark Contingency
The critique of Kierkegaard by Adorno reveals another dimension of Žižek’s formulation of 
repetition and its constitutive limit or impossibility. Adorno suggests that Kierkegaard 
incorporates the hallmark of historicity unabashedly presented by Hegel’s notion of history (the 
progression of objective spirit) by trying to avoid Hegel’s philosophy of history through a turning 
inward to the category of ‘the person.’ (Adorno 1989: 32-34) According to Adorno, historicity re-
emerges in the transient existential situation as hereditary sin in Kierkegaard:
In Kierkegaard’s doctrine of hereditary sin, history is nothing else than the formal schema 
according to which the intrasubjective dialectic is to reverse into the dialectic of the 
‘absolute.’ It establishes the borders against mere subjectivity, leaving, however, the 
historical fact in dark contingency. (Adorno 1989: 34)
Adorno’s metaphors allude here to Žižek’s regard for the opacity that persists in Kierkegaard, to 
the point where the subject is reduced to an objectless symbolic mark as an ‘I’ in historical 
discourse. All the more importantly, the concrete antidote to the post-modern simulation of 
history is given a twist here reminiscent of Benjamin’s theses on the philosophy of history: 
history is not natural because history means the violent act of decision recorded by a dominant 
victor. (Benjamin 1968: 245-255) The representation of history is always insufficient to represent 
the totality of history because the truth of history is one-sided; the facticity of the facts remains in 
dark contingency. (Žižek 2001a: 148-149) 
While this opacity is vital for Žižek’s analysis, repetition is the main support of the 
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analyses of historicity in Kierkegaard enacted by both Adorno and Žižek. The first way repetition 
arises in both discussions is through the process of dialectical materialist critique. Here, the way 
an object is expressed/represented as being always-already within the codifications of the 
symbolic universe is the moment of its positing. For Adorno, this makes any aesthetic 
expression a possible site for objective truth because the imagining of a symbolic 
mark/expression always relies on the concept it expresses, and it is when conceptual thought 
breaks down at the point of non-identity that truth can emerge, i.e. where when repetition is 
suspended but techne continues. (Adorno 1989: 40-46) That is to say, the plenitude of 
representation in the symbolic universe becomes reversed into an insufficiency when it is 
deprived of its conceptual support. 
Žižek’s Lacanian reading of repetition in Kierkegaard also suggests that it is the way 
techne is performed that is at issue because the formal structure that registers the craft of 
constituting subjectivity as the expression of a phenomenological intent is itself prone to 
insufferable impossibility. This gap between simulation and the everyday phenomenological 
experience of our life-world reappears again and again in the attempt to simulate everyday 
experience precisely because the subjective life-world is treated as an object. As an object of 
simulation the experience of the life-world is rendered opaque at its core, and therefore the 
conceptual understanding at the level of symbolic meaning is inverted. This opacity 
distinguishing everyday experience from its simulation comes under the banner of Adorno’s 
‘dark contingency,’ something that thwarts the simulation of the life-world because it is itself 
lacking total transparency. The subject’s very awareness of (and trust in) experience implies that 
there is something opaque to believe/trust in, something ideal. 
Due to his dialectical materialism, Žižek often suggests this opacity is the mark of the 
subject in their life-world. (Žižek 2006b: 45-46; 2000b: 62; 1993: 33-35) By being a subject we 
engage techne to integrate into and identify with the world we find ourselves in. But tragically 
this process leads us into alienation at the same moment as the mediation of techne puts the 
world at a symbolic distance, a “sickness unto death” (Žižek 1997: 90) where imaginary 
possibility is of greater value than real/impossible actuality; the anxiety of what one can be over-
determines what one is. (Žižek 2006b: 89; 2002a: 136-137; 2001a: 105) Following Adorno, this 
relation extends this repression of the relation between the subject and the world further than the 
‘organic’ level of immanence, reaching out to the phantasmatic ideal to assure the consistency 
of the life-world. Here we should be careful not to return to the ‘God’s view’ of ideology and 
reality wherein the stripping away of ideology gives us “access to objective reality as it ‘truly is’.” 
(Žižek 2005: 263) As Žižek phrases it: “the ultimate support of the critique of ideology – the 
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extra-ideological point of reference as ‘ideological’ – is not ‘reality’ but the ‘repressed’ Real of 
antagonism.” (Žižek 2005: 263) The subject’s ‘sickness unto death’ rests on the inability to 
internalise some hard traumatic kernel which they then attempt to negotiate around by 
positioning themselves in relation to the phantasmatic ideal. On the one hand, the fantasy of 
beauty (i.e. technological progress improves the quality of human life) sustains the plane of 
immanence where the subject is/relates. On the other hand, the other side of fantasy sustains 
where the subject is not, the spectral apparitions that invoke my envy about what the Other is 
doing just out of my sight (i.e. humanity is only able to be thought through technological ways 
and becomes yet another technical object). For the immanent communal relation to be sustained 
the community is regulated by the former ‘beautifying’ fantasy while the latter ‘envious’ fantasy 
embodies its necessary disavowal. (Žižek 2005: 266) The challenge then is to locate the 
antagonism that distorts these fantasies, necessitates their askance particularity. 
This process bears a striking similarity to our earlier methodological elaboration of 
dialectical materialism. Here we have the reversal (critique) of the inverted thesis, that 
conceptual understanding alone is insufficient for knowledge, and so the process of dialectical 
critique returns to the aesthetic sphere of material appearances and a new thesis: the human 
subject pursues the understanding of the world through techne but this process itself puts the 
world at a distance and it is only by the failure of techne, when technology does not smoothly 
function, that we are forced to confront the world beyond the mystical conceptual strictures of 
the ‘object.’ One should note here the clearly Hegelian position being elaborated: the 
contradiction of techne, understanding the world only puts it at a greater distance, reveals the 
limit of techne, i.e. when technical understanding fails the subject is forced to confront the world 
beyond her/his conception of it.
V. The Two Prongs of Mallarmé: Necessity and Antecedence
The ontological repercussions for maintaining this naïve phenomenological trust in the 
experience of the life-world are elaborated on by both Badiou and Žižek using the demonstrative 
example of Mallarmé’s experimental poetic modernism. Underlying Žižek’s engagement with 
Mallarmé is the formulation of the commands of authority in the post-modern universe as 
imperatives to enjoy. (Žižek 2002: 231-233) As an imperative, this argument about the formal 
structure of duty in the post-modern universe constitutes the particular mode of enjoying (mode 
de jouir) that valuates the variety of objects and activities able to be taken up by the subject. 
With this configuration of propriety supporting his argument, Žižek is specifically interested in two 
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features of Mallarmé’s work: the future perfect and the failure of sustaining identification. The 
future perfect (futur antérieur) tense of Mallarmé’s famous ‘nothing takes place but the place’ 
(rien n’aura eu lieu que le lieu) is read by Žižek to be “dealing with a utopian state which, for a 
priori structural reasons, can never be realized in the present tense.” (Žižek 2000: 31) This first 
aspect suggests that far from merely being an ignorant stasis, the post-modern subject’s naïve 
trust in phenomenological experience has a powerfully conservative political direction and 
fetishist economy of value. The presence of an ideal point in the present constellations of value 
and social links in the life-world encourages the identification of the subject at the same moment 
that the subject can never realise this identity beyond merely a token gesture, a marker of the 
yet-to-come. And this tension remains an extant simulation of the future proper.
Žižek takes up a second aspect of Mallarmé’s work where this failure of identification is 
its justification, “his entire writing is nothing but a series of failed attempts to produce ‘the Book’.” 
(Žižek 2002: 110) In the case of Mallarmé this repetition of failure constitutes the justification of 
“modern art as ‘experimental’.” (Žižek 2002: 110) Such a formulation of the tension between 
what is and what ought to be is a shift into a symbolic universe where transparency is 
impossible. This impossibility is included within the bounds of the symbolic universe with the 
advent of an ethical agency, “of an irreparable symbolic debt which undermines the ‘regression’ 
to the fetishism [sic] that pertains to the status of the traditional work of art.” (Žižek 2002: 111) 
Fetishism therefore disappears from the symbolic universe, only to emerge as a little piece of 
real-value that animates and disrupts the continued attempts to constitute a symbolic totality. To 
rephrase the interlinking of these two aspects of Mallarmé in the terms of techne and 
impossibility: it is not that the symbolic universe reifies techne as a tool for performing the 
identity we experience in our life-world but that technology, technical knowledge, and techniques 
(more broadly, technicity) are staged as a claim to identity where you can be anything, 
anywhere, at any time, but only where the subject is not present. In the categories of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis techne therefore appears along the vector from the Imaginary to the Real, it is 
the realisation of a fantasy decoy that promises the total perfectibility of identity and only alludes 
to the successful constitution of ‘my place in the world’ against the backdrop of nothingness. 
When I attempt to locate myself in this imaginary scenario it dominates me, renders my identity a 
merely ‘re-presentational metaphor’ of who I am and not ‘the real me.’ As a fundamentally 
symbolic object, identity is herein set against the symbolic universe as a space of meaningless 
formulae unable to be integrated into our vivacious life-world. Inter alia, as the realm of 
nothingness the symbolic universe therefore constitutes techne only to immediately dissolve its 
activity where techne cannot serve the life-world of the subject, and thus identity is short-
12
circuited from within the very processes that constitute it. Identity herein becomes a void place, 
and it is this paradox of the placelessness of the promise of place sustained by technology as a 
symbolic construct that is the ‘loop of freedom’ invoked by techne.
The logic here is that of the Moebius strip articulated in the later work of Lacan. Žižek’s 
use of this logic denotes that when the subject attempts to locate themselves at the heart of a 
signifying order as the agent who structures the symbolic universe they find that this place of 
super-egoic enthronement is always just beyond the grasp of the subject in the Symbolic. 
Compositely, this would suggest that Badiou’s enthronement of Mallarmé as the poet of the 
Event means that Badiou recognises in Mallarmé’s oeuvre an acute awareness of this 
antecedent displacement. What at first appeared to be the powerful arbitrary designations of an 
‘authoritarian personality’ becomes historically necessary and beyond the reach of the lust for 
power. Such a critical evaluation of the symbolic universe demystifies it at the same moment that 
it reveals the principles and axioms that guide techne as standing in for a blind horrific necessity 
which deprives the subject of their subjectivisation as autonomous individuals. Techne here 
functions as a stand-in for a normative necessity outside the subject’s histoire, or, in Hegelese, 
‘the negation of the negation of techne’ is autonomous because causality is exterior to the 
identity of the subject. This is exemplified by Žižek’s allusions to Stalin’s appeal to historical 
necessity wherein “we, the Communists, are people of a special mould. We are made of special 
stuff.” (Stalin in Žižek 2002: 257) And what is the Lacanian name for this ‘special stuff’ but the 
“objet petit a, the sublime object, the Thing within a body.” (Žižek 2002: 257) Hence we come 
upon the procedure of subtraction where the kernel or trace (tracé) of the Real is found in the 
imaginary semblance standing in for the Abyss by stripping away all the descriptive (imaginary) 
content to access the hard core of the semblance, that which makes its existence necessary and 
Real (in the Lacanian sense). 
It is at this impossible point that Žižek seems close to Badiou between the recognition of 
subjectivity within the bounds of an imaginary scenario staged in the ontological abyss so as to 
spare the subject an encounter with the necessity of some dark contingency and the Pyrrhic 
elucidation of the kernel of the Real. Hallward has suggested Badiou endorses a move toward 
condensing the imaginary semblance into a complex pure, singular, and sublime object where 
for Žižek the ontological abyss, the Abyss, disappears when we remove the simple/fundamental 
imaginary stand-in (there is literally Nothing to orient the subject). (Hallward 2003: 149) But 
Badiou’s enthronement of poetry by way of Mallarmé troubles this point. With Mallarmé Badiou 
develops poetry as a procedure capable of providing us with generic truths, and herein Mallarmé 
becomes “a thinker of the event-drama.” (Badiou 2005a: 191-198) In Mallarmé’s work Badiou 
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finds a double sense of the “aleatory event” of coming upon truth: “the staging of its appearance-
disappearance, and of its interpretation which gives it the status of an ‘acquisition for ever’.” 
(Badiou 2005a: 191) With Mallarmé one often finds references to traces of an absent cause, an 
antecedence that directs the critical gaze toward the truth that something has indeed occurred. It 
is not a refusal or ignorance of the ontological abyss, but a more subtle method of its expression 
in service to the revelation of truth. 
Given Badiou’s tendency toward revelation in the case of Mallarmé what then does 
Žižek’s engagement with the French symbolist poet reveal of his ideology-critique and the place 
of techne? Let us begin with the culmination of the points presented from the work of Badiou 
above: “one must not conclude in nihilism.” (Badiou 2005a: 198) As a relational and 
transformative activity, techne can serve many ends including nihilistic clearing. Within Žižek’s 
ideology-critique it is possible to discern nihilism engaging the subject from without through 
Žižek’s morbid “fascination with a lethal Thing.” (Žižek 1989: 181) The manifestation of the Thing 
leaves nihilism as an acerbic taste in the subject’s mouth as they are forced to ‘ingest’ their 
contingent basis under the rule of something resisting the instrumental machinations of the 
technologically savvy subject of the post-modernist universe, e.g. the predestination of necessity 
overwhelms the polymorphous performance/constitution of identity. As an explicitly subjective 
activity techne therefore becomes subservient to the imaginary-Real as it is subsumed by some 
sublime Cause.
This move from the covering over of identity to the apparition of necessity haunts the 
subject’s raison d’être with a sublime Cause. Herein nihilistic clearing becomes, on the one 
hand, crucial to critiquing the ideological filler sustained by this covering over. Yet such a 
clearing threatens the subject’s raison d’être with the deprivation of its purpose. This interior 
threat of critique manifests in the empty space of the normative background conditions 
sustaining the symbolic universe as the logic of the discourse is sublated and nothingness 
washes into the empty space of normative conditions. With the nihilio of nihilism inhabiting the 
normative framework we are then confronted with the positive law of techne, how the subject is 
to craft their raison d’être in the fragmentation of a discourse deprived of its normativity. This 
task is an exemplar of transitions from one normative framing to the next. Copyright, for 
example, forever classes challenges to its normativity as ‘pirating’ as though to suggest that the 
agents of the illicit challenge are bereft of obeying the rules of capitalist ownership when it is 
rather that the mode of ownership itself has become untenable given the disappearance of the 
old horizon/limit of possibility that sustained the background conditions of this socio-institutional 
framework; the ‘order’ of copyright being exposed as pathologically obedient to the determinate 
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conditions of the objects under its aegis such that there is no ‘natural right’ to ownership at all 
(one is reminded here of the electronic hacker mantra from the 1980s: ‘the information wants to 
be free’). Far from technological developments threatening to destroy the fabric of society or the 
emergence of some kind of ‘neo-Luddism’ that can visualise industrial collapse and ruin, the 
annihilation of the normative background conditions destroys the fantasmatic framework that 
sustains the limits and possibilities of the axiology that makes objects mediated by the symbolic 
universe intelligible. (Jones 2006: 230) Here we encounter a kind of psychical break wherein the 
chaos that would otherwise be gentrified by discursive logics surges through the symbolic 
universe and destroys the ‘autonomy of choice’ held in check by the dialectic of limitation and 
possibility. 
Nevertheless, the subject persists in this ‘meaningless universe,’ and the way is open for 
the reconstitution of the normative conditions. This shift from negative annihilation to 
transformative affirmation is precisely the point where Badiou demands that we cannot conclude 
in nihilism. (Badiou 2005a: 198) Yet there is a certain shift that must take place here, from 
clearing customary determinate values to dedicating oneself to a Cause. This shift rests on the 
persistence of the subject, or to phrase it in terms of dialectical materialism: while everything ‘out 
there’ may objectively exist, where does my seemingly transparent subjective interiority fit in a 
world of opaque material? It is not enough for the subject to simply produce something or 
perform an action, they must have a ‘frame’ through which this production or action can be 
understood. This frame is the positive law of techne inasmuch as the term designates art and 
craftsmanship, the ‘way’ something is produced or acted out. Herein techne performs the 
normative conditioning of the symbolic universe after nihilism has cleared the customary 
traditions, determinate content, and so forth. Yet techne’s positivity relies on the persistence of 
the subject which is itself a negation of the objective order of material that is crafted through 
technics.
This post-nihilistic breaking out of annihilation is given philosophical license by another 
relevant lesson Žižek draws from Mallarmé: the persistence and therapeutic value of thought. 
Žižek pertinently aligns himself with Mallarmé’s (and Badiou’s) designation of the coincidence of 
subjectivity and universality: 
I become ‘universal’ only through the violent effort of disengaging myself from the 
particularity of my situation: through conceiving this situation as contingent and limiting, 
through opening up in it the gap of indeterminacy filled in by my act. (Žižek 1997: 222)
Therefore it is not the case that the subject has a spurious moral duty to engage their life-world 
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in a critical manner because this position relies on there being an ideological ‘filler’ for the gaps 
in the life-world of the subject, the moments of decision are filled in by the ‘right’ choice. Instead, 
and as Hallward outlines in his discussion of Žižek and Badiou, Žižek qualifies critical thinking 
with the extra-clinical value of a “therapeutic form of engagement with the real.” (Hallward 2003: 
151) In this way Žižek’s intellectual project finds its point of difference with Badiou’s thought. For 
Badiou focus is given to the event of truth which destroys and renews the conditions of my 
existential situation. Žižek on the other hand focuses on the occurrence of the Real in the 
paradoxes of everyday experience in the life-world of the subject. This differential formulation of 
Žižek’s focus signals that while thought may be reduced to “an ultimately passive and at best 
therapeutic form of engagement with the real” (Hallward 2003: 151) in his ideology-critique, this 
simply emerges because Žižek affirms the fundamental role of inconsistencies in enabling life-
world activities to be meaningful in an otherwise indifferent world. And it is this strong focus on 
the paradoxes of the Lacanian Real that constitutes the critical import of Žižek’s ideology-
critique: to not let the dangers of the (de)mystifying of techne in our life-world pass by unnoticed.
VI. Beckett and the Abyss
Beckett appears in Žižek’s critical analyses as a figure that helps to further the above 
elaboration of the indivisible and persistent drive that defines the subject a propos the attempt at 
purification by Mallarmé and the consequence of its post-nihilistic transformative affirmation by 
techne. Where Kierkegaard provides Žižek with a critical formulation of repetition and Mallarmé 
delivers a configuration of experimentation which Žižek subsequently twists to reveal the effects 
of an imaginary semblance, Beckett’s work exemplifies Žižek’s formulation of the human 
condition a propos Kierkegaard and Lacan: “Man as such is ‘nature sick unto death’, derailed, 
run off the rails through a fascination with a lethal Thing.” (Žižek 1989: 181) This fascination with 
‘a lethal Thing’ is given a particular comportment in Beckett’s oeuvre that specifies it as partly 
composed of repetition, imaginary lure, and the especially Beckett-esque framing of human 
existence as the drive to persist. Žižek uses the language of this Beckett-esque persistence to 
compose a wager on the basis of drive that moves near to Badiou’s insistence on thought: “in 
the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on.” (Beckett in Žižek 2006c: 
120; Beckett 1976: 418) This insistence of the ‘core’ of humanity can subsequently become a 
sublime object of ideology, as in the case of human rights where this real-kernel of the human is 
the basis for the ideological Cause of humanitarian debate. Moreover, we should note how this 
drive to persist conjures the coincidence of necessity and ethical agency at the precise moment 
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of the subject’s non-identity. To return to the example of human rights, this coincidence suggest 
that humanitarianism is a discursive method of mediating the repression of the antagonistic 
kernel that persists in the heart of being ‘human,’ allowing rights to assert humanity as a Thing 
and not merely another epistemological object. However, here the subject’s being human does 
not coincide with their identity within the bounds of the language of rights but instead the subject 
becomes ‘human’ through the drive to persist beyond the limited nature of humanitarian 
discourse. It is as though the naming of ‘the human’ in rights discourse obscures the unbearably 
‘all too human’ element that persistently resists to be gentrified by the symbolic universe that 
propagates the ‘second-order’ representational language of rights. Beyond the noisy discourse 
of human rights, the ‘all too human’ persists in silence as the locus of what makes the subject 
necessarily human and, therein, bound to the (categorical) ethical moment that frames the 
customary morality of rights.
Žižek takes his wager on drive from the language of Beckett’s The Unnameable (1976). 
This reference elucidates an important feature of the framework of Žižek’s ideology-critique, 
namely the reformulation of non-identity. What is at stake in Žižek’s critical analysis is not a 
dialogical opposition of two elements but rather a specific triadic relation where a third element 
intervenes in the juxtaposition of a thesis and its antithesis. (Žižek 2006c: 120) Beckett’s 
characters manifest their ‘all too human’ humanity as this third element in a modality reminiscent 
of Žižek, an indivisible remainder that resists being subsumed into the dialectical interplay of ‘the 
human’ and ‘the unhuman.’ Herein, the indivisible remainder that Žižek takes from his reading of 
Schelling underscores the grounding of hysterical human subjectivity, “the hysterical – feminine 
– subject merely ‘imitates’ morality, symbolic order, and so on; she merely ‘puts on’ morality 
without effectively identifying with it.” (Žižek 1996: 78) Like the indivisible remainder that grounds 
the ‘imitative play’ of the hysterical subject, Beckett’s drive to persist grounds the subject in the 
opaque core of their raison d’être that always exceeds the attempt to describe this subjective 
purpose in the determinate ontic horizon of discourse and its objects. This minimalist conception 
of the subject is crucial to understanding both Beckett and Žižek’s comments on ‘the human 
condition’ because it is here that we find a formulation of the ‘all too the human,’ that which 
resists and exceeds discourse and at the same time interrupts the phantasmatic consistency of 
discursive logic (i.e. the ethical injunction intervenes in the customary morality sustained by 
discourse).3
We can observe this distortion as the effect of the inhuman on the terms of the human 
and unhuman by way of the activity of techne. The inhuman intervenes in the human as that 
which makes the human necessarily human. Beyond all purification, the kernel of the Real in the 
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imaginary content of ‘the human’ defines the human as a persistence that cannot be articulated 
in the imaginary content alone. Positing thus becomes ‘alienation’ through the very techne of 
imagining ourselves as human. Compositely, in the instance of the unhuman, the inhuman 
intervenes as that point where the human is revealed as fundamentally indifferent to the 
symbolic universe and therefore meaningless to it. Because the order of the symbolic universe is 
negative it furnishes reality with objects that differ from one another. The associations between 
these objects are sustained by the self-referentiality of representation, the logic/syntax of the 
symbolic universe. The third element intervenes in the fundamental motion of the symbolic 
universe to thwart the over-writing of thetic positing. This intervention forces the unhuman to fall 
short of constituting a Whole, a totality. Indeed, the inhuman functions as a primordial Third that 
puts the human ‘out of joint’ with the unhuman.
Herein, we may read the third element as a formal structure. Like non-identity, it 
manifests at the point where the object exceeds our conception of it. And also like non-identity, 
the third element provides a focus for critique. However, unlike non-identity this element is not 
some part of reality shining through our imagining. Rather, the third element is not a manifest 
resistance but something real that exceeds reality’s insistent existence. Simply put, this ‘third 
element’ is a persistent and radical antecedent. 
Beckett emphasises this third element within the class of what Žižek calls a minimal 
difference, the bare minimum between existence and nothingness. (Žižek 2003: 93-98) But 
whereas Mallarmé’s poetry invokes a subtraction of the Abyss in an attempt to access “the 
Book,” Beckett’s theatre and prose identifies the human with their inhuman element. (Žižek 
2002: 110) This emphasis on the third element pushes Beckett’s characters to constellate their 
raison d’être in the face of an existential abyss, the half-light of non-being (non-sens). The 
subtracted subjects of Beckett’s work dwell in the turmoil of imprecise repetition and re-
beginning (re-presentation). (Hallward 2003: 404n9) Under this (Badiou’s) description, Beckett’s 
characters come very close to Žižek’s articulation of the Lacanian third, the Real; “the sense that 
the Real in Lacan can only be grasped through negative description,” (Lecercle 2004: 214) i.e. 
senseless, indifferent, impossible, and so on.
The status of this persistent acting in the Real, signalled by Beckett, is received 
differently by Badiou than by Žižek. Badiou praises Beckett for this reduction of human subjects 
to their generic state because it signals the anti-philosophical emergence of truth as some 
unnameable element internal to the object. (Badiou 2005: 54-55) For Žižek however, the real-act 
is a special case of the human subject encountering the ultimate ‘truthlessness’ of their finitude. 
(Žižek 2000a: 166-167; Hallward 2003: 261) In both instances the Real persists as the focus 
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proper, but Badiou and Žižek’s respective exegeses are discursively different. Despite this 
tension at the level of discourse, both Badiou and Žižek conceptually point to the Real as a 
resistance; for Badiou it is the resistance toward naming and fantasisation, for Žižek it is the 
resistance toward totality and death.
According to the ideology-critique of Žižek, the meeting of objects’ resistance to the 
conceptual furnishings of the subject’s persistence confronts the subject “with the death drive at 
its purest, prior to its reversal into sublimation.” (Žižek 2000a: 160) Following this principle of the 
encounter between objective resistance and subjective persistence in the real-act, to say 
Beckett’s characters are reduced to a type of bare humanity is to follow Žižek all the way: 
What ‘Death’ stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 
‘night of the world,’ the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the 
severing of its links with ‘reality’. (Žižek 2000a: 154)
This passing from the bonds of symbolic reality does not conclude with silence. Rather, following 
Lacan, Žižek designates this nihilistic clearing of existence as the moment of “the symbolic New 
Beginning, of the emergence of the ‘New Harmony’ sustained by a newly emerged Master-
Signifier.” (Žižek 2000a: 154) This reconstitution of the symbolic universe puts the subject out of 
joint with the positive order of entities. The subject heretofore ‘posited’ becomes the indivisible 
excrement of the reconstituted symbolic universe because they have undergone a radical 
subjective destitution in their encounter with the death-drive. (Žižek 2000a: 161; Hallward 2003: 
262) Thus we can come to an understanding of repetition and re-beginning in Beckett, the way 
the subject that is deprived of all but a positive minimum of unnameable truth persists as a 
remainder in the eternal Abyss. Indeed, the death-drive is not a tendency toward self-destruction 
but rather immortality, the resuscitation of finitude through persistence (life beyond death, the 
dimension of the undead). (Žižek 2000a: 294) This minimalist reduction of the subject to the 
bare minimum of their self-posited raison d’être heralds the drive to persist, to re-structure the 
universe of symbolic relations from the vantage given by this (Žižekian) minimalism.
Although the Abyss does differ from the subject’s self-positing as a remainder as it is 
signalled by the work of Beckett, the subject in the Abyss is neither alienated nor separate. The 
minimum of difference between the Abyss and the subject-as-remainder flags the contingent 
existence of the subject’s persistence wherein their activity, named ‘techne’ above, is reduced to 
a form that is purified and subtracted. However, when Žižek locates the subject stripped bare by 
Beckett in political ordering, such as that of the ‘undead’ Jew in the Nazi concentration camps 
(the Muselmann), we already find an ideological reconfiguration underway. (Žižek 2006b: 112-
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113) Žižek appropriately names this human subject reduced to their generic indivisibility a 
‘sublime object of ideology.’ (Žižek 2006b: 113 & 365-366) Such a subject is an ideological 
phenomenon insofar as at the level of description they are reified by the socio-symbolic order 
structuring reality (as with the discourse of human rights, in a way our humanity echoes that of 
the Muselmann). That is to say, reification occurs when the discourse focuses on a particular 
object and fills any inconsistencies in the symbolic universe/reality with the semblance of this 
object. However, despite the illusions endowed by this reification Žižek stands by the strength of 
the ethical moment which it engenders. (Žižek 2006c: 118-120) When the subject is taken as 
generic they are reduced to an inhuman remainder that cannot be absorbed into the reified 
symbolic description of humanity but which nonetheless constitutes the truth of humanity 
because it cannot be explained away by the self-referentiality of the symbolic universe. Ethics 
therefore emerges from the truth of techne, the attempts of the subject to find their place in the 
symbolic universe when the symbolic universe ejects them and they nonetheless persist.
The repercussion of this formulation of ethics a propos techne is that the subject is 
exposed to a radical Otherness. (Žižek 2006b: 113) Such Otherness situates other subjects 
beyond merely constituting New Age mirror-images along the path to my self-realisation. Rather, 
in others I observe an abyssal dimension which defeats my ability to empathise with them: “can I 
really rely on him? Who is he? How can I be sure that his words are not a mere pretence?” 
(Žižek 2006a: unpaginated ) In this precise sense the subject-as-remainder constitutes a stand-
in for this abyssal dimension, a contingency which at any moment might disrupt the flow of the 
relation between the subject and another entity. For this reason, when we inquire into another’s 
purpose for doing something,
[It] is not simply an inquiry into ‘What do you want?’ but more an inquiry into ‘What's 
bugging you? What is it in you that makes you so unbearable not only for us, but also for 
yourself, that you yourself obviously do not master?’ (Žižek 2006a)
A subject as an other (and ultimately as a subject as such) is therefore always subject to a 
presupposition, a belief, because all relations that can be constituted are in some way part of a 
symbolic logic. Given to the pretence of the signifier in this way, the subject is always ‘a subject 
supposed to…’ This supposition is filled out by whatever product the symbolic universe 
associates with the techne of the subject. In the case of the psychoanalyst for example, the 
analyst is the subject supposed to know the meaning of the patient’s symptoms. (Žižek 2006a: 
unpaginated) Or, in the case of Žižek’s engagement with ideology-critique, Žižek is the subject 
supposed to intervene in ideas and elucidate their critical structure. Techne therefore always 
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implies the pretence of a commitment to its ends, even though it holds the status of a means 
rather than that of a synthetic imperative. But further than this, as a presupposition in possession 
of some antecedent truth, the subject is haunted by their a that exceeds their designation by the 
symbolic universe because they cannot directly access the real-kernel of their self, it must 
always be mediated and performed vis-à-vis techne. (Žižek 2006a: unpaginated) Thus the 
critical value of Žižek’s ideology-critique is that it interrogates this pretence of the signifier which 
can represent the subject for another signifier, but which is not the subject as such in their 
private historico-genealogical specificity.
VII. Conclusion
In the above discussion it was revealed that the critique of techne as an ideological 
phenomenon extends from the understanding of techne as the dynamic character of the 
subtracted subject as a bare remainder of the idea (Geist) of her/himself. The effects of this 
dynamic constitute the structure of the life-world of the subject. And this constitution can be seen 
in the ‘Aristotelian’ character of the life-world; the way its validation hinges on activity/techne 
having some pretence to purpose. (Habermas 2003: 44) In this context, the demystification of 
the life-world is a direct intervention into this sense of purpose. From here we have seen how 
Žižek’s ideology-critique interrogates this raison d’être of the life-world to the end of locating its 
imaginary contents that serve to form the ideological filler that renders the life-world transparent, 
without distortion or paradox. To Žižek’s reasoning, this ideological naturalisation of the life-world 
through its simulation is problematic for the explicit reason that it conceals the disruptive forces 
which traumatically impose themselves on the subject, such as the case of necessity or the 
pretence of techne that deprives the subject of their historico-genealogical specificity. (Žižek 
1989: 123) 
The naturalising of the subject’s ethico-symbolic raison d’être taking place in the life-
world is critiqued by Žižek as the second in a series of three restrictions on the subject’s ability to 
consistently constitute a social link. By way of Kierkegaard we observed above how Žižek 
elucidates these three moments of imaginary alienation, symbolic separation, and subjective 
destitution. (Žižek 2001: 78-83) In each moment Žižek designates a mode of enjoying and an 
opaque core which the mode of enjoying repeatedly attempts to colonise but cannot directly 
access. This critique of repetition results in a very particular conception of the subject and 
techne: the human subject pursues the understanding of the world through techne but this 
process itself puts the world at a distance and it is only by the failure of techne, when technology 
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does not smoothly function, that we are forced to confront the world beyond the mystical 
conceptual strictures of the ‘object.’
Ultimately, this confrontation of the subject with the symbolic universe binds them to an 
ethics a propos techne. Using Žižek’s insight as to how the subject observes an abyssal 
dimension in other people that defeats their ability to empathise with them, this abyssal 
dimension was revealed above as a radical element which may at any moment disrupt the social 
link between subjects, thwarting their techne. (Žižek 2006a: unpaginated) Such a radical 
element is precisely the a of the objet petit a discussed above, but in the context of morality and 
the social link formed through discourse it must be performed and mediated by techne. 
Therefore, we may conclude that Žižek’s ideology-critique reveals an antagonism at the heart of 
the category of the symbolic universe, “the world of the machine,” (Lacan 1988: 47) that 
threatens to rupture this symbolic universe, and this is fundamentally driven by the aesthetic 
modulation of his critique as Geisteskritik. 
Notes
1. These three levels also have their Lacanian coordinates as imaginary alienation, symbolic 
separation, and subjective destitution, which we must pass over herein due to the unfortunate 
limitations of space.
2. For both Žižek and Adorno, in the mode of dialectical materialism this style of intervening 
critique takes aim at the formal ‘ideated’ structure of the ideas/spirit (geist) which are contained 
by some ideological belief/motif, and therefore has an affinity with Idealist metaphysics.
3.  This philosophical rendering of the underlying theory of ontological persistence in Beckett’s 
prose ostensibly differs from the orthodox reading of finitude in French theory; see Migernier’s 
Beckett and French Theory (2006) for a summary of this orthodoxy.
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